Mutual assured destruction
The doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry
to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked
for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal
or greater force. The expected result is an immediate
escalation resulting in both combatants' total and assured
destruction. It is now generally assumed that the nuclear
fallout or nuclear winter resulting from a large scale
nuclear war would bring about worldwide devastation,
though this was not a critical assumption to the theory
of MAD.
The
doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare
to launch a first strike because the other side will
launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with
secondary forces (second strike) resulting in the destruction
of both parties. The payoff of this doctrine is expected
to be a tense but stable peace.
The
primary application of this doctrine started during
the Cold War (1950s to 1990s) in which MAD was seen
as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts
between the United States and the Soviet Union while
they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world.
It was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations
struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain
second-strike capability. Although the Cold War ended
in the early 1990s, and as of 2007 the U.S. and Russia
(former USSR) are on relatively cordial terms, the doctrine
of Mutually Assured Destruction certainly continues
to be in force although it has receded from public discourse.
Proponents
of MAD as part of U.S. and USSR strategic doctrine believed
that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither
side could expect to survive a full scale nuclear exchange
(as a functioning state). Since the credibility of the
threat is critical to such assurance, each side had
to invest substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals
even if they were not intended for use. In addition,
neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately
defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles.
This led both to the hardening and diversification of
nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear missile silos,
ballistic missile submarines and nuclear bombers kept
at fail-safe points) and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty.
This
MAD scenario is often known by the euphemism nuclear
deterrence. The term deterrence was first used in this
context after World War II; prior to that time, its
use was limited to legal terminology.